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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STJ\TE OF UTAH

LOWELL PO·TTER,
Plaint~ff,

vs.

Case No.

UTAH-DRIVE-DR-SELF SYS·TEM,
INC., a corportion of Utah, and
V. H. ANDERSON,

120359

Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 2, 1959, the Plaintiff atte·nded the Defendant's place of business and rented an automobile.
At the time of rental a contract covering the rental was
executed by the Plaintiff and one oopy retaine·d by him.
(Exhibit 3, Exhibit 8, R-5 line 21 and R-7 line 21)
1
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Under the terms of the contract the Plaintiff agreed
to return the vehicle rented the same day ·an.d a deposit
commensurate with this period of use was received by
the Defendant. (R-19, R-20, R-41)
In violation of the provisions of paragraph two (2)
on the reverse side of the Rental Agreement (Exhibit 3,
Exhibit 8) the Plaintiff did not return the vehicle on the
agreed date but retained the same until February 10,
1959 (R-48, R-49). The Defendant commenced an investigation on February 4, 1959 (R-44), and checked with the
Salt Lake C'ity Police Department, the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's office, telephone directory and city directory,
and through each source was unable to locate the Plaintiff or the vehicle. (R-45 through 47, R-10, R-11)
The Defendant attended the ·County .Attorney's office
and made a complete disclosure of facts on February 6,
1959 (R-11, R 60, R--!7). The ·County Attorney advised
Defendant to wait a few days to see if the vehicle would
be returned. (R-34, R-47). The police officer was directed to make a further search an-d return at a later date.
(R-35) The Defendant and the police officer returned
to the County Attorney's office on February 9, and the
police officer represented that he had made a further
search but he could find neither the house nor the automobile, (R-35, R-56) whereupon the County Attorney
advised them of other f.acts "ithin his kno". .ledge and directed the Defendant to sign the Criminal Complaint.
(R-36, R-37, R-63, R-64) There is no evidence that the
Defendants had ~ny kno,Yledge relative to the Plaintiff
that they did n10t communicate to the County Attorney.
There is no evidence of any misrepresentation of fact
1

2
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In relation to the disclosures to the County Attorney.
The Defendant asked the County Attorney if a crime had
been co1nmitted and the ·County Attorney advised hin1
that a crime had been committed and recommended the
issuance of the Complaint (R-12, R-35, R-66). The
chronological sequence of events as shown by the testimonies, affidavits and reeords is as follows:
M·ax Miner, Agent for ithe Defendent. (R-40)
'' Q. Did you deliver the Exhibit 3 to Mr.
Potter at the time of execution~
A. Yes, I did."
The Plaintiff, lVIr. Potter testified as follows:
•
'' Q. D'id this eonversation that you .are 'talk""J
about lead up to the execution of this rental agreenlent, this proposed Exhibit 3 ~ (R. 7)
. "
A . Y es, s1r.
·The Defendant V. A. Anderson testified as follows:
'' Q. Did you make any investigation in relation to this rental~ (R-44)
A. Yes, A lot of them

* * *
Q. And then on the 4th what investigation
did you make~
A. I called the police dep.artmen t to see if
they had any record there. I called the driver's
lieense division aJt the State C'apitol. They had a
license issue to Mr. Potter. I think it was 254
Union Avenue they showed. I went to the Sheriff's
office to see if they had any information on this
thing an·d one place would le.ad me to anoth'er
and- (R-45)
Q. Did you try telephoning~
. .-\. Yes.
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3

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

·Were you successful1
N o't in locating Mr. Potter.
Did you find a listing~
No.
Did you try the City Directory ?
I tried the City Directory and telephone
0

inform~ation.

Q. Were you able to locate the party in
either of thos.e 1
A. The City Directory gave Mrs. Potter as
an employee of Harmon's Cafe.
Q. At what address, do you recall1
A. At about 3900 South State.

* * *
Q. What is your next source of inquiry after
not being able to locate by the City Directory or
Telephone Direct·ory 1
A. I asked the polic.e department to put out
an order to locate, just to locate the car, and find
where it was so we could get in touch with them.
Q. Were you ever informed that that car
was located 1
A. No. They were unsuccessful.
Q. Did you n1ake any inquiries through the
Sheiff's office1 (R-46)
A. Yes.
Q. And who did you direct your inquiries
to at the Sheriff's office~
A. To Officer Mander. (Tohmander)
Q. And what date would that approximately
have been~
A. Well I think that would have been approximately the 6th of February.
Q. And wh~at did y·ou ask the Sheriff's office
to dof
4
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MR. DUNCAN: Just a minute. I object to
any hearsay testimony.
THE COURT: The objection will be overruled. I don't think that is hears.ay. You may
proceed.
A. I asked if they had a deputy in that area
and if they would be kind enough to have him stop
by this address and if they could locate either the
car or Mr. Potter to ask him to come in; that he
was late, and that we would like to know when he
expected to bring the car back and pay the rental
up.

Q. Did you receive a repor't from the
Sheriff's office~
A. Yes. They were unable -

* * *
Q. What was the report that you received
from the Sheriff's office~
A. They said they were unable to locate the
address or Mr. Potter or the car. (R-47)
Q. And who made that report to you~
A. Officer Tohmander.
Q. Did you contact anybody in the Salt Lake
City police office, the police department~
A. Yes, I had done that a day or so before
and I at that time contacted Officer Stroud and
asked him if he got out that way 'to see if he could
locate it.
Q. Do you know whether or not Officer
Stroud made an investigation~
A. Yes, he did.
Q. Did you contact the office of the County
Attorney~

A. Yes. When Offi,cer S'troud came back .and
said he couldn't find the address or the car or Mr.
5
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Potter, I asked if he would mind going over to the
County Attorney's office with me and see if they
thought a complaint should be signed.
Q. And who did you see in the County Attorney's office~
A. Mr. Mark Miner.
Q. And what did you tell Mr. Miner~
A. We told him just about exactly as I have
told the court here now.
Q. Is there anything that you have told the
court at this point that you did not tell Mr. Miner~
A. No. No, I told ~Ir. ~liner everything I
knew.
Q. Was a complaint issued at that time~
A. No. He said he thought we had better
w·ait a few days and see if the car didn't show up.
Q. All right. When did you next attend the
County Attorney's office~ (R-48)
A. About three or four days after that.
Q. And who was with you at that time, was
anyone~

A.
Q.
A.

Officer Stroud.
Officer Stroud was 'Yith
Yes ....

Q.

And who did you see in the County At-

you~

* * *
torney's office~
A. Mr. Miner.
Q. And did you n1ake any further report to
Mr. Mine.r~
A. Just to the effect that the car had not
been located nor had !fr. Potter been located, nor
had we been .able to locate the address and ' Te
hadn ''t been able to locate neither !fr. Potter or
the car or the address and would he advise issuing
the complaint~
6
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Q. And did he so advise f
A. Yes. He said he thought it should he
done.
Q. Did you thereupon sign a eomplaint ~
A. Yes.
Q. Did you make any other telephone c.alls
trying to locate th'is party~
A. Yes. I didn't stop attempting by phone
and one leading to another I finally located Mrs.
Potter's mother.
Q. And about what ~day would that, be~
A. Well that was late ~the night before Mr.
Potter brought the car in.
THE COURT: And after the complaint "ras
issued~

A.

Yes."

* * *
"Q. Now you mentioned you noted jn the
City Directory that Mr. Potter's wife was ernployed by Harmons ~ (R-49)
A. Yes.
Q. Did you check with Harmons Cafe?
A. I did by phone.
Q. And did you receive a report from them?
A. Just to this effect that they didn't have
any idea where she w.as at or where either she or
he could be located.
Q. Did ~they say whether he or she was employed by them~
A. She was not employed by them.

* * *
Q.

Now did you go to 256 Union

Avenue~

(R-50)

A.

No, I didn't.
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Q.

Did you at any rate find 256 Union

Avenue~

A. No.
Q. You didn't ever go down there~
A. No.
Q. You didn't ever go down to Midvale, did
you~

A. No, I didn't.
Q. Well isn't it a fact that you went down
there and tried to locate that car and tried to
locate that 254 Union Avenue~
A. No.
Q. You didn't do that~ (R-51)
A. No.
Q. And your testimony no'v is if Mr. Miner
said that that is not true, isn't that right~
A. No. I asked Mr. Miner about 256.
Q. You didn't say anything about that~
A. I got the report from the police and the
Sheriff.
Q. B·ut you didn't do ·anything yourself
about that address, is that right~
A. Nothing except what was given to me by
them.
Q. You didn't go out to Midvale at any time
to try to locate that address yourself~
A.· No."

Salt Lake Sheriff Superintendent Deputy Weston
Tohmander testified as follows:
"Q. And what is your position in the Salt
L.ake County ~Sheriff's office~ (R-51)
A. Superintendent Deputy. I have charge of
the record of cars and accidents and traffic. . ..
Q. During that period did you receive any
inquiry from a Mr. Vern Anderson who you have
8
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just seen testify~ (R-52)
A. I did.
Q. Would you have any note or memoranda
in your possession that would indicate that~
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Would you please refer to it~
A. This is a report of a car, a '59 ~Chev, four
door sedan, hard top, license number EH 5904.
Q. Now can you, by referring to that form,
tell me when you first had contact wi th Mr. Andersonf
A. On the 9th is the rep·ort from the Salt
Lake City Police Department. My contact here,
a note on the back I have here thaJt first conta;ct
with V em on Anderson.
Q. All right, will you please tell me what
your note states~
A. This is the car which we attempted to
locate for Vern Anderson, Hertz Driv-Ur-Self or
advise the driver, Lowell Pott.e.r, 256 Union Avenue. This was February 5, 1959.
Q. That was on February 5th that you had
the inquiry apparently made at your office, is
that right~
A. Yes, that's right. (R-53)
Q. Now is this your handwriting on the back,
1

sir~

A. Yes, sir.
Q. That is made about the time you got the
report or the form, is that true~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did you make a report to Mr. Anderson~

A. Yes.
Q. And when was that report

made~
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A. On the 6th, this notation here, the 6th of
February, 1959 Car 12 is the car in the Midvale
area, reports no such address nor any of the
neighbors have every heard of such a person. Mr.
Anderson was advised.
Q. Y·ou had adVised Mr. Anderson of it~
A. I signed it, yes, sir.
Q. And that would be on about the 6th~
A. Yes, sir, February 6th.
Q. I have no further questions."
Salt Lake City Police Officer Alva C. Stroud testified as follows:

"Q. And what were your duties in that department on and between those dates~ (R-54)
A. I worked out of the auto theft bureau.
Q. Now have you met Mr. Anderson before~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you are acquainted with him, are
you~

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did he n1ake inquiry of you in relation
to a Mr. Lowell Potter on or about those dates~
A. Yes, sir, he did.
Q. And what did he ask you'?
A. He s'tated that a car had been rented and
Lowell Potter had rented the e.ar and wanted it ·
to be check out. (R-55)
Q. Did you make any checks in relation to
that~

A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. What checking did you do~
A. I checked the address at 256 Union .A.venue ,and couldn't find any place with an address
of that number.
Q. On \vhich side of the street would 256 be'

10
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A. Are you familiar with this area, first'?
Q. Yes, sir. On which side of the street
would 256 be~
A. It would be on the south side of the
street.
Q. And are odd numbers on the other side~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. vVere. you able to locate the address~
A. No, sir, I wasn't.
Q. Were you looking f.or the car at the same
time1
A. Yes, sir, I was.
Q. And were you able to locate the car In
the area~
A. No sir, I couldn't.
Q. Did you and Mr. Anderson attend the
County Attorney's office~
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. And who did you speak to in the County
Attorney's office~
A. Mr. Miner.
Q. And what did you advise Mr. Miner?
A. I advised him I was unable to locate this
address out on Union Avenue, this 256.
Q. Did you advise him that you were unable
to locate the car, also 1
A. Yes, sir. (R-56)
Q. And I believe, sir, you had two visits,
so let's lim~t ourselves to the first one. Did you
ask him whether or not he thought it advisable to
issue a criminal complaint on this matter~
A. At this time he said vve should wait a fe\Y
more days before issuing a complaint.
Q. Did he ask y·ou to do any further investi1

gation~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

A. Yes, sir, he did.
Q. And what further investigation did he
request~

A. I checked the driver's license bureau at
the State Capitol to see if they had a license
under a Lowell Potter at 256 Union Avenue. I
also checked the State Tax ·Commission and found
a car had been registered under I\1r·. Potter's name
and he listed the address at 254 Union Avenue.
Q. Did you make another tour out there~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And were you able to locate the address
again~

A. No. sir.
Q. Were you looking for the car~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you able to locate the car~
A. No, sir.
Q. And do you know whether or not there
has been - what do you call it - a general locate
out on this car~
A. There had been, yes, sir.
Q. And had any of your police cars reported
on the general locate~
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you again visit ~Ir. )finer and did
you advise him of these matters that you just
testified to? (R-57)
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were there .any other matters that may
have come to your knowledge or information that
you hold brim?
A. Oh, just 'vhat we have stated here.
Q. Now did you make notes or a report in
relation to this matter?
A. Yes, sir, I did.

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q. And do you have that with you~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did you check that before the trial?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. And so you had the written memor.anda
that has refreshed your recolleetion of these facts,
is that ·correct~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. On the last interview with Mr. Miner, did
he recommend that a complaint issue~
A. Yes, sir, he did.

* * *
Q. Now you didn't stop and talk to anybody
on Union Avenue~ (R-59)
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Did you have the description of the car~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the license number~
A. Yes.
Q. What time did you go out there~ (R-60)
A. The first time was before noon. In fact
both days it was before noon.
Q. Do you remember what day it was~
A. The first day it was the 6th. The second
time it was on the 9th. That was February."
Deputy County Attorney M.ark S. Miner testified as
follows: (R-61 through 66)

"Q. Did Officer Stroud and Mr. Anderson
attend your office for the purpose of consulting
you in relation to having a complaint issued in
this matter~ (R-61)
A. Yes.
Q. And as I recall your prior testimony,
they attended your office on two occasions, is

13
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that

true~

A.

That's correct.
Q. All right. Did you have any occasion to
consult with any other members of the County
Attorney's staff in relation to this matter~
A. Yes.
Q. And when would that discussion have
taken place ~
A. The complete facts of this transaction
was laid before the County Attorney and the complete staff and it was their recommendation that
a complaint be issued in this case.
Q. And it was after that meeting that you
told Mr. Anderson that you would recommend
the issuance of a complaint~
A. There was certain events took place during a staff meeting which brought this case under
discussion.

* * *
Did you have other facts at your disposal
In relation to this case that weren't furnished
to you by Officer Stroud and ~fr. Anderson~
Q.

(R-62)

A. I did.
Q. And did those facts affect your decision
in this rna tter ~
A. They did.
Q. Were they facts that would have normally come to the knowledge of Officer Stroud or
first Mr. Anderson~
A. No. They would have no knowledge of
these facts.
Did those facts pertain to any of the
events related to the transaction with the Utah
Q.

Driv-Ur-Self~

14
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A. I would say no, they only related to the
whereabouts of Mr. Potter.
Q. Did they relate to any events that had
taken place or transpired within the State of
Utah~

A. No.
Q. Did they relate to anything that had to
do with the disappearance of the automobile of
the Utah Driv-Ur-Self~
A. I thought so.
Q. Did they have anything to do with the
location of the automobile~
A. Well, I thought so.
Q. But they had nothing to do with any
facts pertaining to this particular transaction~
(R-63)
A. Well, in my opinion, they did.

* * *
Q. Did you have any indication that the
car might not be used locally~
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And did you tell Mr. Anderson about
this probability at the time that he signed the
complaint~

A. If I recollect I told Mr. Anderson and
!fr. Stroud when they came into the office ~-.-hat
I had learned at the staff meeting.
Q. And did you have any reason to learn
that the car might not be in the State of Utah~
(R-64)
A. I did.

* * *
Q. I will withdraw the question. What did
you advise Thfr. Anderson and Mr. Stroud as to
probable location~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A. I advised the1n that in 1ny opinion Mr.
Potter had the car in 1\fontana because we had
an inquiry from there from the District Attorney
in Butte, Montana, concerning Mr. Potter on some
bad checks.

* * *
THE COURT: Did you tell Mr. Stroud and
Mr. Anderson thatt
A. I told them both that.
THE COURT: And before the complaint
was signedt
A. I told them before the complaint was
signed.
THE CO·URT: It may stand.
Q. I'm not sure I covered this, but I think
I did. This whole matter "~as discussed in full
council in the County Attorney's office, is that
truet
A. That's correct.
Q. And "\vere some of these inquires or
these notes received during that conference~
A. Well they \vere received at my conference with Mr. Stroud and Mr. Anderson, the
second conference was the following Monday.
Q. No, I mean the conference with the
County Attorney in the County Attorney's office,
the conference 'vith the County Attorney and the
other deputies. Did you have this conversation
at that time1 (R-65)
A. Yes, it caine in during the staff n1eeting
and that is 'vhy that "~as discussed.
Q. Now I have no further questions.

Q. Regardless of the fact that you represented hlln you recon1mended - you represented
bin1, I believe, this is in the past, was it not~
]()
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. Yes.
Q. In spite of that fact you did recommend
that the complaint be issued~
A. Yes. I certainly recommended that it
be issued.
Q. 'Vhy did you advise Mr. Anderson?
THE COURT: Did you advise Mr. Anderson about that?
A. That I had represented him~
THE COURT: That you recommended the
complaint be issued.
A. Yes, I advised it. It was on my re-commendation the complaint was issued.
Q. I have no further questions.''
There is on the record no indication of ~any facts
that were known to the Defendants. and no't disclosed to
the ·County Attorney.
(For emphasis., the Appellant has italicized portions
of documents and authorities. quoted in 1his brief.)
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
The ·Court erred in denying Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment of Dismissal, in that:
THE AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS BEFORE THE
COURT, NONE OF WHICH WERE ·CON'TRO·VERTED, INDICATED THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAD MADE A COMPLETE DISCLOSURE OF ALL PERTINENT F A·CTS 'TO THE
COUN'TY ATTORNEY WHO THEREUPON OF HIS OWN
INITIATIVE ADVISED 'THE ISSUANCE OF THE CRIMINAL ·COMPLAINT.

POINT II
The ·Court erred in denying the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict, in that :
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AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PLAIN'TIFF'S CASE
IT VvAS APPAREN'T THAT ALL FACTS KNOWN TO THE
DEFENDAN'T HAD BEEN DISCLOSED WITHOUT RESER\1 ATION TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND ITHAT THE
COUNTY AT'TORNEY ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE HAD ADVISED THE ISSUANCE OF THE -CRIMINAL COMPLAINT.

POINT III
The Court erred in denying defendant's motion for
a directed verdict and defendant's motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict, in that :
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CASE IT WAS APpARENT TH~T THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE INDICATED FULL AND ·COMPLETE DISCLOSURE OF ALL
l\IATERIAL FACTS BY THE DEFENDANT TO THE
COUNTY A'TTORNEY WHO OF HIS OWN VOLITION ADVISED THE ISSUANCE OF A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT.

POINT IV
The Court erred in denying the Defendant's Motion
for Directed Verdict and Judg1nent Not Withstanding
the Verdict, in that :
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ADDUCE ANY EVIDENCE
OF MALICE.

ARGlTl\fENT
POINT I and POINT II
The Court erred in denying defendant's motion for
summary Judgment of dismissal, in that:
THE AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS BEFORE THE
COURT, NONE OF WHICH WERE ·CONTROVERTED, INDICATED THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAD MADE A COMPLETE DISCLOSURE OF ALL PERTINENT FACTS TO THE
COUN'TY ATTORNEY WHO THEREUPON OF HIS O·WN
INITIATIVE ADVISED 'THE ISSUANCE OF THE CRIMINAL .COMPLAINT.

18
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The Court erred in denying the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict, in that:
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PLAIN'TIFF'S CASE
IT WAS APPARENT THAT ALL FA~CTS KNOWN T'O THE
DEFENDAN·T HAD BEEN DISCLOSED WITH,OUT RESERVATION TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THAT THE
COUNTY AT'TORNEY ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE HAD ADVISED 'THE ISSUANCE OF THE ·CRIMINAL COMPLAINT.

The argun1ent in relation to both Point I and Point
II will be p-resented under this heading in that the principal facts are practically identical. At the time of the
Motion for Summary Judgment, the defendant's position
was established by Affidavits and Depositions and opposing Affidavits were not presented. At the time of the
Motion for Directed Verdict at the conclusion of the
plaintiff's case, the facts had been adduced by the plaintiff in his case and such facts are almost identical with
the facts shown by Affidavit, etc.
In relation to the Summary Judgment if p·rimary
issues or contested fac.ts are not made apparent by
opposing Affidavits, the ·Court should enter a Summary
Judgment.
41, American Jurisprudence, Pleading Sec. 340.
Page 523.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
"340. Generally *** the courts have in general upheld, as constitutional and valid, statutes
or rules of Court requiring the defendant, in
specified cases, to file an affidavit of defense,
*** answers filed in certain classes of cases may
be stricken out and summary judgment rendered
on motion of the plaintiff supported by affidavit
unless the defendant supports his answer by af"D.
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fidavit showing such facts as may be deemed
by the court hearing the motion sufficient to entitle him to defend."
At the conclusion of the Plaintiff's case all major
facts were of record. The Plaintiff had determined that
Mark Miner was the Deputy Criminal Attorney for
Salt Lake County (R-57) and that Mr. ~finer issued
the Complaint himself. (R-35)
"A. I issued this complaint myself. I charged
Mr. Potter with embezzling a car,"
and that the complaint was issued by reason of additional facts within the knowledge of the ·County Attorney. (R-36 and R-37)

"Q. Mr. Miner, were there other facts in your
possession that caused you to issue this complaint~

A.

Yes.

A. Yes, in 1ny opinion a complaint should
have been issued from the facts presented to
me, from the information made available.
Q. '''as the infor1nation 1nade available only
the information furnished by !fr. Anderson and
Officer Stroud~
A. No. I had other -''
Mr. Potter by his own testimony indicated that his
house number did not conform to the nmnber placed
on the car rental agreement. (R-21 and R-22)
"Q. l\f r. Potter, "·here is your home~
A. ~5() Union Avenue, Midvale.
Q. Is there a house in l\fidvale on Union
Avenue Nu1nber 256·?
20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. I don't know.
Q. Is your house number 2561
A. It is number 297 right now.
~

..

Q. Do you have any relations or any in-laws
that live at 297 East 9700 South 1
A. That is my mother-in-law that lives
there.
Q. That isn't Union Avenue1
A. That is Union Avenue."
All of the general authorities hold that a complete
disclosure to the County Attorney relieves the person
signing the Complaint from any liability in a malacious
prosecution action. The Rule of Law is well stated in
Corpus Juri's Segundum, Volume 54, Malacious prosecution, Chapter V as follows:
"SECTION 46-AS A FlJLL OR PARTIAL DE.FENS.E
"As a general rule the defendant makes out
a complete defense by showing that he submitted
to the proper counsel a statement conforming to
legal requirements concerning the guilt of the
accused, that in good faith he received advice
justifying the prosecutor, and that he acted on
the advice in instituting the p-roceedings of which
the plaintiff complains.
As a general rule, since advice of counsel
goes to the question of probable cause and must
be considered in determining the matter, defendant makes out a complete defense by showing that
he submitted to proper counsel a statement conforming to legal requirements concerning the
guilt of the accused, and in good faith he received
advice justifying the prosecution, and that he
acted on that advice in instituting the proceedSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ings of vrhich plaintiff complains. If he shows
these things he is entitled to immunity from damages, although it may appear that the facts did
not warrant the advice or the prosecution or that
the accused was innocent ***"
"SECTION 48-BY \VlfO~I AD\TICE GTY.EN
"Paragraph B-BY PUBLIC COUNSEL as
follows:
"As a general rule, the fact that the defendant acted on the advice of competent and qualified
public counsel is a defense to a suit for malacious
prosecution ***"
and a similar reporting of the general rule is contained
in 34 An1erican Jurisprude1tceJ Section 72, page 748.
"Sec. 72 Prosecuting Attorney-It is established that if, in addition to his own belief, a
defendant proves that before commencing the
prosecution of the criminal proceeding complained of he sought the legal advice of an officer
selected by the people to prosecute offenders
against la-\\~s, and in good faith fully and fairly
disclosed to that officer all the inforn1ation he
possessed, and he was advised that a crilne had
been co1nmitted, the defendant has made out a
eo1nplete defense to the action. This is true even
though the advice Inay haYe been erroneous ...
So, also there is authority to the effect that the
individual ,,~ould be protected by the advice even
though he n1ay not have stated facts which he
eould have ascertained b;~ reasonable diligence,
thP reason being that it is the duty of the public
prosecutor to investigate charges of the coinmission of crime."
ThP la\\~ in the f'tnte of 1Jtah is in conforn1ity "~ith
t hP ho·t'nPral rule. The earliest TTtah case is the ease
l\[c l(enzi<' V8. Canning~ 131 Pacific 1172, 4:2-Utah-529,
1913 "rherein the court stated as follo"\\t""S:

22
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·'***What divides the parties is this: The
defendant contends that the evidence with respect
to such facts is without conflict, and hence the
court, on his request ought to have directed a
verdict in his favor on that ground; the plaintiff,
that there is some conflict as to whether the
defendant stated to counsel all the material facts
known to him, and as to his belief of the plaintiff's guilt of the charge. *** We think the evidence, without conflict, shows that the defendant
substantially stated to counsel all the material
facts known to him; that upon them they advised
him; that he, on such advice, instituted the criminal prosecution ; and that in doing so he acted
in good faith and upon a well-grounded belief
of the plaintiff's guilt. *** "In other words, the
jury 1nay not arbitrarily reject the defendant's
evidence show~ing a well-grounded belief by him
of the plaint~1ff's guilt. *** If the defendant ***
had knowledge of other facts which would tend
to explain or modify them or tending directly to
sho"\v want of probable cause ... this would be a
question for the jury. *** but this does not apply
to a case where all the und~sputed facts known to
the defendant, taken together, would justify in a
reasonable person the honest belief that the fact
charged was probably true. In such case the defense would be absolute as matter of law, amd
the jury would have no right under the pretense
of saying the defendant did not beli-eve, to find
against him. *** Upon the evidence we think the
defendant was entitled to a directed verdict in
his favor; for the assumed facts as to the question of probable cause, and upon which the court
directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, were without any substantial conflict."
The :\IcKenzie case was followed by Kennedy vs.
Burbidge, 183 Pacific, 325 54 Utah-497, 1919 wherein
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the court In a Malacious prosecution action stated as
follows:
(Page 326) "In an action for malicious prosecution at least three distinct matters are necessary to be alleged and proved: ( 1) That the
proceeding complained of as ground for the action
was without probable cause; (2) that the proceeding was malicious; and (3) that the proceeding was finally terminated in favor of the
plaintiff."
(Page 328) "We are not disposed to hold that
a prosecutor acts without probable cause merely
because it turns out that the information upon
which he acts was false.''
The case of Thomas vs. Frost, 27 Pacific 2nd, 459,
83-Utah-207, again contains discussion of the law in
relation to the defense of disclosure and the court stated
as follows on page 463:
" ( 3) The important question the court and
jury had to consider was whether or not the
defendant, in causing a complaint to be issued
charging plaintiff with perjury, acted maliciously
and 'vithout probable cause. Both must concur
in order that the defendant be held liable. Kennedy v. Burbidge~ 54 lTtah, 497, 183 P. 325, 5
A.L.R. 1682; Singh v. !facDonald, 55 Utah, 541
188 P. 631.
In the Frost case there was competent testimony
indicating that the appellant did not make truthful stateInents and the court a.fer reviewing such evidence stated
as follo,vs on page 463:
.. There was competent testimony offered by
thr re~pondent "~hich, if believed by the jury,
eonr.ln8ively- proved that the appellant did not
1nake a truthful state1nent of the facts to the
24
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county attorney, but, on the contrary, misled
the county attorney."
In the case at point there is no evidence that the
appellant did not make a truthful statement of the facts
to the county at orney or that he misled the county
attorney. To the contrary, the facts indicated that in
addition to the disclosures of the appellant, the county
attorney on his O"\Vn initiative obtained other inforination which persuaded him to issue the ·Complaint. (R-36
and R-37)
In the fairly recent case of Uhr vs. Eaton, 80 Pacific 2nd, 925, 95 Utah, 309 the court reaffirmed the
fundamental law in case and stated as follows on page
929:
"We accordingly hold, on the record before
us, that there appears su0h a substantial conflict
of evidence regarding the necessary elements
of probable cause as to require the submission of
this issue to a jury. In .doing so, however, we do
not relax the time-honored rule that .a truthful
and full disclosure of the facts to a prosec~ttor
constit~ttes a complete defense to an action of
this kind."
In the case at hand there is no conflict of evidence
requiring the submision of the cause to the jury. In the
recent case of J. Hensley Cottrell vs. Grand Union Tea
Company, 299 Pacific 2nd, 622, 5 Utah 2nd, 187, Justice
Crockett, in considering another case involving a malacious prosecution action resulting from an e1nbezzlement
complaint stated as follows (Page 623):
"The critical point of inquiry is this : Considering all of the evidence, could reasonable
minds fairly say that they were not convinced hy a
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preponderance of the evidence that the defendants made a full and truthful disclosure of the
material facts to the country attorney~"
In that case, the Court found that there was considerable discrepancy in the testimony and some testimony indicating that a full and faithful disclosure was
not furnished. In that case, the judge notes in reference
to evaluation of the testimony of the parties as follows:
(Page 624)
"Self-interest is uniformly recognized as a
factor which may be considered in evaluating or
in discounting testimony... Each of the witnesses
relied upon by the defendants have such motivation...
"The only one of plaintiff's "Witnesses for
'vhom they can clailn any degree of detachment
is nfr. Taylor, t:b.e Deputy County Attorney."
It should be noted at this point that in this case
Mr. Miner, the Deputy County ...._-\_ttorne:~, was an independent witness, l\Ir. Stroud, the City Police Officer
" . as an independent ,,. itness, and :Jir. Tohmander of the
County Sheriff's Office, "\Yas an independent 'ritness
and none of these "\ritnesses " . ere n1otivated b:~ any pecuniary interest. Justice Henroid, in his dissent to the
Cottrell case, (Page 627) stated as foli0'\\ S:
7

''The only pertinent question here is whether,
before signing a con1plaint against the plaintiff
for e1nbezzlernent, respondents made a full disclosure of the n1aterial facts in their possession,
to a DPput~. County Attorne:T, who, after filing
the ron1plain t, rnoved its dismissal 'rhich was
granted."
~r r.

rraylo.r, Deputy County Attorney in the Cottrell
26
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case, stated that his opinon might have been changed if
additional facts propounded by the Plaintiff had been
disclosed. In the instant case the Deputy ·County Attorney, ~Ir. ~finor, made no such qualifications nor were
any additional facts propounded by the Plaintiff.
Our sister states have had two rather recent eases
involving a similar issue. In the case of Montgomery
Ward & Company vs. Pherson, 272 Pacific 2nd, 643,
Colorado 1954; another case involving malicious prosecution as a result of a complaint in embezzlement, the
Court stated as follows (Page 646):
(Page 646) " ( 5) It is for the best interests of
society that those who offend against the laws
of the state shall be promptly punished, and that
any citizen who has reasonable grounds to believe
that the law has been violated shall have the right
to cause the arrest of the person whom he honestly and in good faith believes to be the offender.
For the p1.trpose of protecti·ng h£'m in so doing,
it is the generally established r1.tle that if he has
reasonable grottnds for his belief, and acts thereon in good faith in causing the arrest, he shall
not be subjected to damages merely because the
accused £s not convicted. The rule is fo111nded on
the grounds of public policy in order to encourage the exposure of crime.
(Page 647) "The rule that advice of counsel,
properly taken and relied upon in good faith,
is a defense to a suit for malicious prosecution
applies with greater reason when the proceeding
complained of was instituted by and with the
approval of the prosecuting officer, in this instance the district attorney."
" ... 'Acting in good faith upon the mistaken
opinion of counsel will not subject the prosecutor
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to liability to the person prosecuted.' " (Page 648)
". . . The evidence, it seems to us, clearly
established the defendants instituted the prosecution in good faith and on advice of counsel,
and that under the evidence presented defendant's motion for a directed verdict in their favor
should have been granted.
"These conclusions make it unnecessary for
us to consider the other points urged for reversal
of the Judgment.
(Page 648) "The Judgment is reversed and
the cause is remanded with direction to enter
judgment in favor of the defendants."
Thomas vs. Hinton, 281 Pacific 2nd, 1050, 78 Idaho
337, April 1955 :
(Page 1055) "'*** "In this class of cases the
liability of juries to lose sight of the real issues,
and to be influenced by sentiment, rather than
the pertinent facts, is noted by careful observers.
In the language of ~!r. Newell: "Our experience
teaches us there are feu~ questionsof law more
diffvcult of apprehension by a jury than those
wh~ch govern trials for malicious prose·cution. It
seems difficult for them to appreciate, if the
plaintiff was really innocent of the charge for
"rhich he "\Vas prosecuted, that he still ought not
to recover. They do not readily comprehend why
an innocent man n1ay be prosecuted for a supposed crime or offense, and yet have no recourse
against the prosecutor "\vho caused his arrest and
i111prison1nent.' Ne,vell on Mal. Pros. 279." '"
1\f ontgorner~. Ward & Co. vs. Pherson, Colo., 272
Pacific 2nd 643 at pages 646, 648."
(Page 1056) "Where the evidence clearly establishes that the defendant instituted the proseention in good faith and on the advice of counsel,
28
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a motion for directed verdict in defendant's favor
should be granted. Montgomery Ward & Co. vs.
l)herson, Colo., 272 Pacific 2nd, 643.
"It is our opini~on that appellant complied
with the advice of counsel rttle. It} therefore}
becan~e a q1testion of law for the court to ,dec~de
and not a question of fact to be submitted to
the jury and the motion for a d~recte.d verdict
should have been granted.'}

The above cases contain profound staten1ents relating to the public policy involved in malacious proseution cases and when such policy is applied to the instant
case there should he no question but that the defendants
should he immune from damages.
POINT III
The Court erred in denying defendant's motion for
a directed verdict and defendant's motion for Judgment
Not Withstanding the Verdict, in that:
AT THE .CON~CLUSION OF THE CASE IT WAS APPARENT THkT THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE INDICATED FULL AND ·COMPLETE DISCLOSURE OF ALL
MATERIAL FACTS BY THE DEFENDANT TO THE
COUNTY ~TTORNEY WHO OF HIS O·WN VOLITION ADVISED THE ISSUANCE OF A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT.

The authorities cited in support of points I and II
are equally applicable in support of this point.
The factual situation differs in the consideration
of this point for the reason that the defendants had presented their case and there is affirmative evidence in
the record as to the disclosures and the basis for the
disclosures to the County Attorney. The defendants
established affirmatively that copy of the written conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tract of rental was delivered to the plaintiff (R-40)
and that the cash deposit taken under the rental agreement was in accordance with the general policy of the
defendant corporation for a one-day rental and that
if the car was to have been detained for a longer period,
a larger deposit would have been required (R-41). The
investigation by Mr. Anderson, rental manager for the
defendant, was reviewed in detail and it was sho·wn
that the defendant checked the telephone directory, telephone information service, city directory and driver's
license division personally (R-44, -±5.) It is further shown
that the defendant solicited the aid of the Police Department and the Sheriff's Office and asked that they
attempt to locate either the residence or the car. (R45-49)
It was indicated that there might be a possibility
of a relationship between ~Ir. Anderson and the plaintiff's 'rife, but that if there 'Yas such a relationship, it
"'"as unkno'vn to l\Ir. Anderson and there is no indication
that there was any ill "~II between the parties. (R-50
and R-71) The County Sheriff testified as to his search
and his report to l\Ir. Anderson. ( R-51, R-5±) The Police
Offirer testified as to his search and report to ~1r.
Anderson and the fact that he alone represented to
the County Attorney that a diligent search had been
1nade to detern1ine the residenee of the plaintiff (R-54
through R-66) sperifirally as follows:
Q. u Did you n1ake another tour out there'?
(R-56)
•
_t es, s1r.
A • "'\:T
Q. And "·ere YOU able to locate the address
'l O''l]•Jl ~.
(

~~ (

'
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A. No, sir.
Q. Were you looking for the

car~

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you able to locate the

car~

A. No, sir.
Q. And do you know whether or not there
has been- what do you call it- a general locate
out on this car~
A. There had been, yes, sir.
Q. And had any of your police cars reported
on the general locate~
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you again visit Mr. Miner and did
you advise him of these matters that you just
testifed to~ (R-57)
. "
A . Y es, s1r.
The Deputy County Attorney was recalled as a
witness and testified that the entire n1atter had been
placed before the County Attorney's Staff and that it
was their recommendation that a ·Complaint be issued
(R-61). Further, the Deputy County Attorney indicated
that he had obtained additional facts or information
from independent sources and such facts influenced his
decision.

"Q. And it was after that meeting that you
told Mr. Anderson that you would recommend
the issuance of a Complaint~ (R-61)
A. There was certain events took place during a staff meeting which brought this case under
discussion.
Q. Well were there other facts besides those~
A. Yes. Other facts that were brought into
this case and that, coupled with Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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THE COURT: Mr. Miner, I believe you
had. better proceed by question and answer so
that we know what is coming and what to expect.
(R-62)
MR. BIELE: Yes, sir.
Q. Did you have other facts at your disposal
in relation to this case that weren't furnished to
you by Officer Stroud and Mr. Anderson~
A. I did.
Q. And did those facts affect your decision
in this matter~
A. They did.
Q. Did you have any indication that the car
n1ight not be used locally J? (R-63)
A. Yes, I did."

The case no'v differs from the case at the close of
the plaintiff's testimony in that it now appears that the
County ..~..L\.. ttorney directed the issuance of the Complaint
based on infor1nation obtained by him through his office
and, therefore, a different rule of la"T applies. This rule
is succulently stated in the annotation at 10 A.L.R. 2d,
1215:
(Page 1217) ... "The question is, What had
the defendant the right to assu1ne at the time he
called upon the prosecutor the second time and
was directed by him to 1nake oath to this complaint~ ... It must be assumed that defendant,
in swearing to the affidavit, if he himself believed
the truth of the staten1ents, was acting under the
direction of the prosecutor. and had the right to
assume that the prosecutor "Tas instituting the
suit on behalf of the public... '~
''The rule in connection with cases in which
the defendant leaves the matter entirely to the
judg1nen t and responsibility of the prosecuting
32
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officer after a full, fair, and honest discosure
of the 'facts, was aptly stated in Hopkinson vs.
Lehigh Valley R. Co. (1928) 249 N.Y. 29,6, 164
NE 104 as follows: 'If a person disclosed faiJrly
and trt~hfully to an officer whose duty ~t is to
prosecute crime, all matters within his knowledge,
which as a man of ordinary intelligence he ~s
bound to suppose would have a mater~al bearing
tttpon the question of the innocence or guilt of
the persons suspected, and leaves it to the prosecutor to act entirely upon his own judgm,ent and
responsibility as a public officer, and does no
more, he cannot be held answerable in an action
for malicious prosecution, even if the officer
comes to ,a wrong conclusion and prosecutes when
he otttght not to do so.'"
It is difficult to conceive how a private citizen could
conduct a more detailed investigation than was developed by the defendant in this case. If the ,c·ourt sustains
the verdict, it in effect tells the private citizens of this
state that they may not rely upon the repTesentations
of the Police Officers or Deputy ·County Sheriffs or the
County Attorney, but must, in each and every case,
personally investigate the facts and further must hire
private counsel rather than rely upon public prosecutor
to advise them as to their potential liabilities when they
are attempting to do their civic duty in reporting the
•
com1nission of a suspected crime.
POINT IV
The Court erred in deyning the Defendant's Motion
For Directed Verdict and Judgment Not Withstanding
the Verdict, in that :
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ADDUCE ANY EVIDEN'CE
OF MALICE.
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In order for the Plaintiff to recover, he Inust prove
1nalice or at the minimum, show facts or fact situations
from which the jury may infer r11alice. This rule is set
forth in 34 American Jurisprudence, Malicious Prosecution, section 44 as follows :

"C. MALICE
Page 727 "44 Generally'' It is an elementary
rule, supp·orted by numerous authorities, that it
is essential to a recovery in the action of malaci·ous prosecution that the action or prosecution
complained of must have been maliJci·ously instituted. This is true whether the action is for the
prosecution of the criminal proceeding or civil
action *** If there was no 1nalice, no verdict at
all shottd be given. Malice is essential to the maintenance of any such action, and not merely to
the recovery of exemplary damages, it, as well
as the 'vant of probable cause, is of the essence
of the action ***
Page 729 '~Sec. 45 *** "It is also distinguishable from mere negligence, in that it arises
from some purpose "\rhile negligence arises from
absence of purpose, the characteristic of negligence is inadvertence or an absence of intent to
InJure, but to constitute 1naliJce there must be a
1notive or puTpose, and it 1nust be an improper
one."
•

In this case there is not a scintilla of evidence indicating n1alice. In fact the record js con1pletely devoid
of any evidence indicating that the Defendants or either
of the1n knew the Plaintiff or had any reason or desire
to do him harn1.
1\faliee is the very essence of an action of malicious
prosecution and "Then, as In this case, the Defendant
34
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

shows that it had no knowledge or intimate connection
\vhatsoever with the Plaintiff and that it relied on the
advice of the prosecuting attorney then any presumption
of malice that might arise by reason of the execution
of the criminal complaint is completely rebutted.
The matter of malice is reported in 10 A.L.R. 2nd
1215 at page 1268 et seq. and one of the best statements
therein contained is on page 1269 as follows :
"It is a well-settled rule in cases of this character, when malice or its equivalent may be involved, that, if the defendant acted solely upon
the advice of a reputable attorney, after fairly
submitting to him all of the facts, this will make
out a complete case against malice or bad faith."
"***The case appears to be wholly without merit.
From the beginning to the end of the proceeding appellant acted with the utmost good faith,
and under the advice of those in authority to
whom he applied, and the evidence shows satisfactorily that there was an entire absence of any
malice on his part toward appellee. Want of
probable cause and malice must concur to sustain
the action for malicious prosecution. Malice having been disp-roved, the action must fail.''
CONCLUSIO,N

The Plaintiff must show malice as an essential part
of his cause of action. A slight presumption of malice
arises by reason of the execution by the defendant of
the criminal complaint. The defendants have clearly
shown that all material facts known to them were disclosed to the county attorney who added thereto facts
or circumstances within his own knowledge and advised
the issuance of the criminal complaint. The presumption
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is" clearly' rebutted by the disclosures and therefore the
court must look to the record of the trial in order to
determine the existance of actual malice. No malice is
disclosed by any part or portion of the record nor is
there any indication of concealment or failure to disclose material facts.
Since the record reveals that there is complete disclosure of all material facts to the County Attorney the
court should set aside the judgment and grant plaintiff's
Motion for Judgment Non Abstante Veredicto.
Even if the court should determine that some additional facts could have been disclosed by the exercise
of extraordinary diligence, nevertheless since the· county
attorney advised the execution of the complaint, not
only by reason of the facts disclosed by the defendants
but by reason of additional facts known only to him,
it becomes apparent that the county attorney as an
officer of the state is the moving party in the execution
of the criminal co1nplaint and the judgment should be
set aside and the defendants ~lotion for Judgment Non
Abstante \Teredicto should be granted.
Further, since the defendants have made full disclosures of all material facts known to them and on
the advice of the county attorney executed the criminal
coinplaint, any presumption of malice is overcome and
the court n1ust look to the record in order to determine
actual malire. No actual n1alice or ill motive is indicated
hy- th0 rerord or may be presmned by facts sho'vn in
the record, and therefore, the Plaintiff's cause fails for
Iar.k of a 1naterial element of this cause of action and
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the Judgment should be set aside and Plaintiff's Motion
for Judgment Non Abstante Veredicto granted.

Respectfully submittted,

IRVING H. BIELE
Attorney for Defendants
and Appellants

Receipt of copies of the above and foregoing Brief
of the Defendants and Appellants acknowledged this
---------------- day of June, 1960.

------------------ .. ----.------------------ .. ----------------LaMAR DUNCAN
Attorneys for PlaJinttff
and Respondent
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